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I INTRODUCTION 
The Court of Appeal judgment of !losking v Runting1 was a landmark in tort, 2 
effectively confirming the wrongful publicity tort as part of the New Zealand common 
law. 3 However, concerns aired by the dissenting Judges are illustrative of the wider 
and more difficult question of whether judicial creativity or legislative intervention is 
in fact the appropriate approach to this particular area of law. Given Justice 
Randerson's denial of the existence of the tort in the High Court, and the strong 
dissenting judgments in the Court of Appeal, this issue remains a live debate. The 
current significance of this question is further illustrated by the recent Law 
Commission discussion paper Protecting Personal Information from Disclosure, in 
which comment was invited on the possibility of creating a new statutory tort of 
. 4 
pnvacy. 
In this paper, it will be argued that the Court of Appeal should not have 
confirmed the existence of the tort, but encouraged parliamentary intervention. It is 
not contended that the protection of privacy interests is unnecessary or unimportant. 
Rather, it is argued that the creation of a statutory tort would be preferable for the 
primary purpose of ensuring and guaranteeing certainty in the law. 
Firstly, a brief background to the law of privacy will be provided from the 
time of its first inception in 1986. This will include an assessment of the development 
of the tort formulation, and the difficulties experienced with the application of the 
formulation . There will also be a discussion of other methods of protecting privacy 
interests, methods which nonetheless fall short of providing full coverage of all 
privacy interests. The purpose of this is to illustrate the continued uncertainty 
regarding the scope of the tort, a problem which Hosking does little to resolve. 
The aim of section Ill is to explain the basic concerns that arise in relation to 
judicial law making, and the potential dan gers associated with it. It will he argued that 
1 Hosking 1• R1111ri11g (25 March 2004) CA 101 /03. 
~ Matt Sumpter and Justin Graham " IP round-up: llosking 1• R1111t111g- New Zealand 's e\\ Privacy 
Tort" (May 200-l ) NC\\ 7ca lancl Intell ec tual Property .Jnl 290. 200 
3 Previous ly 1hi s to rt \1·:is co mmonl y knO\\ n n · publi c di sc losure o f pm ate facl s. 
4 ew Zealand Lw\\ Commiss ion Protecting Perso1111/ !11(o r11111rw11 fi wn Di.1c/ornre· , I Di1·c11ss1011 
Paper (1 L LC PP-19 \V c ll111gto11, 2003) 2-l-27 . 
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these concerns do not prohibit judicial law making entirely, but effectively limit that 
power. As judges arc unelected and unrepresentative they must be careful not to 
invade the political arena, and must ensure that any creativity is approached in the 
appropriate manner. It is argued that the validity of judicial intervention in the area of 
privacy law is questionable, particularl y given the rather politica l nature of the issue. 
The final part of the paper assumes the courts do have the jurisdiction to 
develop the law, and seeks to determine the appropriate approach to wrongful 
publicity in New Zealand. This will include an assessment of the United Kingdom 
position, and a determination of whether New Zealand common law must necessarily 
conform to it. It will be argued that the judiciary's refusal to act in the United 
Kingdom is coupled with the continued parliamentary failure to intervene. The 
absence of any such explicit refusal in New Zealand renders our local climate 
completely different, and affirn1s the ability for judicial intervention. Nevertheless, 
despite judicial power, the flexibility of case-by-case development frequently comes 
at the expense of legal uncertainty. This problem is evident in the case of the wrongful 
publicity tort, and indicates strongly towards a preference for legislative intervention 
which can provide a more comprehensive definition of the tort formulation. 
II THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY FUTILE? 
Eighteen years have passed since the inception of a tort of breach of privacy 
into ew Zealand common law.5 Since that time, cases raising the cause of action 
have been few, their facts varied, and their success limited. The tort has developed 
cautiously and incrementally, and consequently remains ill-de fin ed and of uncertain 
scope. 6 
A Del'elop111e11t of rite Tort For11111/atio11 
The ea e of Tucker v Ne,1 1s Media Ownership saw the birth of a tort of breach 
of privacy in cw Zealand . Viewing the new tort as a natural ex tens ion of the 
5 Tucker" Ne\\'.1 /1/edia Oml('n/,ip /./// [ 19, 6J 2 "J7LR 716 (TI C') 
6 E\·ans states that " . . . the full scope of the tort and the formulauon of'the test arc st ill open to query'". 
Katrine Evans "Was Pri\'acy the Winner on the Day')" ( May 200-1 ) NZ I .J 181 , 18 1 ["Was Privacy the 
\V 111ner on the Day'1"'J. 
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Wilkinson v D011 ·11tow,/ tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, McGechan 
J supposed the introduction of a tort of public disclosure of private facts into the New 
Zealand common law, albeit with caution and hesitation. 8 As McGechan J himself 
gave little consideration to what the actual formulation of the tort might be, it is of 
greater assistance to refer to Jeffries J in earlier injunction proceedings where he 
speaks of "unwan-antcd publication of intimate details of the plaintiffs private life 
which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern, or curiosity."9 It was 
acknowledged at this early stage that if the tort were accepted as established, its 
boundaries and exceptions would require much working out on a case-by-case basis.10 
Due to the stark absence of precedent relating to a civil breach of privacy in 
New Zealand law, detem1ining exactly what the tort entails has proven problematic in 
subsequent cases. It has been necessary to draw largely on United States 
jurisprudence where the tort has developed extensively from the time of the seminal 
article of Wan-en and Brandeis. 11 The first real formulation emerged out of Bradley v 
Wingnut Films, 12 in which Gallen J accepted the formulation of three factors 
propounded by William L Prosser. 13 This initial formulation was the simple public 
disclosure of private facts that are highly offensive and objectionable to the 
reasonable person. i--1 The case of P v D added little other than confusion to the 
formulation by including legitimate public concern, previously seen as a defence, as 
an element of the tort. 15 
Following Hosking, the tort formulation now consists of two fundamental 
requirements. Firstly, there must be the existence of facts in respect of which there is 
a reasonable expectation of privacy, and secondly publicity given to those private 
facts that would be considered highly offensive to an objective reasonabl e pcrson.16 
7 Wilki11rn11 v D0w11rm1•11 [1 897] I Q B 57 . The I e\, 7ea land authority fo, this case of ac tion i<; 
S1eve11so11 v Bashm11 [ 1922] ZLR 225. 
Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd, above n 5, 733 McGechan J. 
9 See Tucker ,, Nell's Media 0 11'11ership Ltd, above n 5, 732 McGechan J. 
10 Tuc/... er \' Ne1\'.1 /\lediu 01l'11 er:i hip Ltd, abo,c 11 5,733 :V lcGcc han J. 
11 Warren and Brandeis "The Ri ght to Pri vacy" ( 1980) 4 l larv L Rev 193 . 
12 Bradley v /Vi11g1111t Films Ltd [ 19931 l NZLR 41 5 ( I IC). 
13 William Prosser and Page Keeton Prosser and Keeton 011 the Lall' of Torts (5ed, West Publishing 
Company, Minnesota, 1984) 856-857. 
,.i Bradley 1· ll'i11g 11 11r Films Lui, abon: 11 12, -1 23 --12 I ( ,:i llcn J. 
15 P v D [2000] ZLR 591 , para 33-34 {I IC) N ichoh on J. 
ic, lluski11g 1· R1111r 111g . above 11 I, para 11 7 Ga ul! J> and Bla nchard J. 
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As to the question of legitimate public concern, it was settled that it should be a 
defence rather than an element of the tort, although little assistance is given as to the 
application of this defcnce. 17 Furthern1ore, to provide assistance to those with the task 
of interpreting the law in the future , the majority asserted that a successful claim did 
not require personal injury or economic loss. Rather, the harm to be protected in 
wrongful disclosure cases is in the nature of humility and distrcss.18 
Although a part of the majority, Tipping J differed from the Gault P and 
Blanchard J in his formulation of the tort .19 He preferred that the question of 
offensiveness be controlled within the need for a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
claiming that a reasonable expectation would rarely arise unless the publication would 
give rise to a high degree of offence and consequent ham1 to the reasonable person. 
He further commented that there could be times when it may be too restrictive to 
require a high level ofham1, for example ifthere was a serious lack of public concern. 
However, in order to ensure that freedom of expression was not unduly limited, it was 
suggested that the test be a substantial level of hami. 20 This test is patently less 
stringent than that propounded by the majority, highlighting the fact that the precise 
appearance of the tort remains controversial , even among members of the same 
majority. 
B Difficulties witlt Application 
Not only has there been difficulty m adequately defining the basic 
requirements of the cause of action, there has also been uncertainty as to how the 
requirements should be applied in practice in order to ensure the administration of 
justice. The requirement that the facts be private is one point of contention . [n Tucker, 
the plaintiff was seeking to prevent the publication of past c1iminal convictions, 
information that is on th e public record . The willingnes c: of the Court to grant an 
injunction in favour of Mr Tucker suggests that it is possible for public facts to 
17 Hosking 1• R11111i11g, abo ve n 1, para 129 Gault P and Blanclrn rd J. The onl y guidance provided is that 
the there is a distinction between leg itimate publi c concern and ge ncrnl curio it y, \\ith onl y the former 
giving ri se to the de fence. 
1
~ I l os l, i11g 1· R11111111g, :.ibO\'C n 1, pa r:i 128 Ga ult P and 13Ll nch:ird J. 
19 Sumpter and Graham, abo\'e n 2. 292. 
ell I loski11g 1· R1111/111g. abl)\'C n 1. para 156 1'1pp111g J. 
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become pri vate over time.21 However, the Couti provided no indication of how thi s 
can happen, and how long it would take. 
As an ex tension of thi s, it has not traditionally been cons idered a breach of 
privacy if the a ll eged breach occurred in a public place.22 ln Bradley, however, Gallen 
J accepted that in some circumstances the fact that something exists or occurred in 
public does" ... not necessarily mean that it should receive widespread publicity if it 
does not involve a matter of public concern."23 An example supporting this 
proposition would be close up photographs taken of an accident victim, or of a 
woman whose clothes had been disarranged by the wind.24 
A further important issue arises out of the private fact requirement, and is one 
that the courts have struggled to pin down in an instructive sense. The issue is the 
extent to which public figures should have a lower expectation of privacy in relation 
to their private lives. Gallen J first commented in Tucker that someone who was in the 
public eye might lose a right to privacy, noting it was a concept that was well 
recognised in United States privacy law. He suggested that this might even apply to 
an individual who was thrust into the public eye unwillingly. 25 In Hosking, the 
majority further indicated that the families of public figures should also expect less 
protection, because the legitimate public interest in the public figure is not limited to 
the individual himself. 26 Commenting that expectations of privacy might be 
diminished in some aspects of the families' private li ves, he leaves the boundaries of 
this rule widely open for development. 27 
Furthermore, there has been differing op1111ons over the necess ity of 
identification of the plaintiff for there to be a successfu l clairn . Thi s issue was most 
21 Prosser also acknowledges that al though the ex istence of a public record \\ ill pro, e significant, under 
spec ial c ircumstances it wi ll not always be conclusive: Wil liam Prosser "Privacy" [ 1960] Ca li fornia 
Law Review 383 , 396. 
22 P1oss<.:r, abu,c n 21, 394-395. lt is acknowkJgcJ that P10sse1 la1c1 acc<.:pls thc11 th t:1<.: JJ1a y bt: 
exceptions to thi s rul e: Prosser and Kee ton , above n 13, 859. 
2
:; Brodie)'" /Vingnut Fi/111s Ltd, above n 12, 424 Ga llen J . 
24 See Stephen Todd (ed) Th e Law of Torts in Ne1 1• Lea/and (Jed , Brookers Ltd , We llmgton , 200 l ) 923. 
20 Tucker, . l\/e11·1 /1/edio 0ll'l1cn hip Ltd. above n "· 735 McGechan J Tim proposi11nn is supported in 
llosl,i11g 1· Ru111111g. abo1-c n I, para 121 Gault P Gnd 13lanch;ird J. 
26 Hosking ,. R1111ti11g, above n l , parn 122 Gau lt P and Blanchard J. 
2' f-lml,111g ,. !?11111111g , Gbove n I, para 124 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
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recently considered by the District Court in l v G28. Judge Abbot concluded that it 
was not a necessary requirement, whilst acknowledging that this was an issue that has 
not been previously considered in privacy literature. 29 The issue had, however, 
already arisen in Brad/ey. 30 Gallen J commented that the tombstone could not be 
identified and implied that this factor counted against a breach of the plaintiffs 
privacy. 31 This particular point in L v G has also been the subject of further criticism 
in subsequent academic writing. 32 The Court in Hosking does not settle this point, 
failing to discuss the issue at all. 
The extent of dissemination that must be given to private facts before that will 
be considered a public disclosure, is another factor that remains undetermined. The 
majority of the cases that have arisen thus far have involved widespread publication 
through media agencies, so this has never really been considered extensively. It has 
been held, however, that disclosure to only one person is not a "public" disclosure. 33 
The degree of intention required, if any, is also an issue that has been 
completely excluded from consideration. Strangely the issue has been overlooked in 
all of the relevant cases including Hosking. This is particularly surprising, especially 
given that the underlying liability for defamation has been such a famous aspect of the 
doctrine. 34 Kalven emphasises that there has also been little discussion of whether 
privacy is an intentional tort in the books.35 
28 L v C [2002] DCR 234 . 
29 L v C, above n 28, 247. Judge Abbot justified his decision by contending that the " ... rights which are 
protected by the tort of breach of privacy relate not to the issues of perception and identification by 
those members of the public to whom the information is disc losed but to the loss of the personal shield 
of privacy of the person to who the information relates ." 
30 In thi s case a famil y tombstone of the plaintiff was shown briefly in the background of a "splaner 
film" shot in a cemetery. The tombstone was never shown in its entirety and the inscription could not 
be read. 
31 Bradley ,, Wi11g11ur Fi/111.1 Ud, above n 12, 425 Gallen J; See also HaITy Kalven Jr "Pn vacy in Tort 
Law-Were WaITen and Brandeis Wrong?" ( 1966) 3 1 Law and Contemporary Problems 326, 333 . 
Kalven indicates that identifi cation is a necessary requirement for a success ful claim with the followmg 
co111111e11t , " ... so111c 1cfc1em:c Lo 1hc plc1 i11tiffi11 th c: mass 1m:d ia \\ ithout hi s co 11sc 11L , \\ hi ch 1cfc1c11ce 
must involve the use ofh1s name. hi s likeness, or some recog111?able pcrsonnl deta il of hi s personality 
or biography." 
32 Katrine Evans "01' Privacy and l'rostit11tes" j 2002 J NZU LR 7 1. I: vans argues that 1dent1 fi cation 1s m 
fact a key clement for \\ hat i, to he tc: r111ed a breac h of pm·acy 
'' X ,. ,1-C [ 199-t] :---!Z f-LR -t33 . 
3
-1 Kalven. abo ve n 3 1. 335. 
'' Kalven. abo \C n 3 1. 335. 
8 
As illustrated above, the Court of Appeal in Hosking provides little assistance 
111 clarifying any of these issues. It is likely that the new formulation will in fact 
exacerbate the uncertainty as it has modified the way the tort is to be applied, thus 
restricting the instructive value of the earlier precedents. The requirement that the 
infonnation be imparted in circumstances purporting an expectation of privacy is an 
inherently lose and vague concept, and the majority does not provide any real 
guidance as to exactly what this means. It is argued, therefore, that application 
difficulties will only continue. 
In light of all this, Kalven's condemnation of the privacy tort (as originally 
stated by WaITen and Brandeis) on the basis that it lacks any "legal profile"36 regains 
resonance today in New Zealand. The level of guidance provided by the cases is so 
scant that its application is largely discretionary and thus unpredictable. The scope of 
the tort remains tenuous, and as was the situation at its first implementation, requires 
vast moulding on a case-by-case basis in the future. 
C Common Law Protection of Privacy Interests 
There are a number of other common law causes of action that may be brought 
against those who publish sensitive private facts about people, some of which were 
also argued in the privacy cases mentioned above. These actions include intentional 
infliction of distress, malicious falsehood, trespass, defamation, breach of confidence, 
nuisance, copyright, negligence and breach of contract. onetheless, these do not 
prove adequate to protect the wide variety of privacy interests.
37 For example, 
although defamation docs have the ability to protect interests that are akin to privacy 
interest where the information is also damaging to the reputation, it is a complete 
defence to defamation to prove that the inforniation published about the plaintiff was 
true. 38 
'
6 Kal\'Cl1, abun: 11 3 1, 333. 
'
7 Toclcl , above 11 24,911 : Rosemary Toh1n "ln\'asion of Pri\'ac y" [20001 NI'.! J 216, 216. 
,s Todd. aho\ c 11 2~. 91 5. 
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Breach of confidence has also worked in a number of cases to really protect 
what are privacy interests,39 and some committees investigating privacy consider it 
one of the best avenues for privacy protection.
40 In New Zealand, however, a breach 
of confidence claim will only succeed where information has been imparted in 
circumstanced impo1iing an obligation of confidence.
41 The breach of confidence 
claim failed in P v D because the infom1ation was not imparted in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence. One of the few deserving privacy plaintiffs, 
this case illustrates conclusively the need for further protection of privacy interests. 
D Conclusion 
The New Zealand courts have had time to develop the new tort and build up a 
body of precedent providing satisfactory guidance and certainty in the law. However, 
although there is a need for increased privacy protection, case-by-case development 
has proven highly problematic and slow. Certain important aspects of the law remain 
undetem1ined. In the end, the fonnulation today is no more valuable than it was at the 
time of Bradley, rendering the law unacceptably inadequate. 
III THE LAW MAKING FUNCTION OF THE JUDICIARY 
The rhetoric regarding the issue of judicial law making is plentiful and varied. 
The concerns that arise in relation to the issue are based on democratic ideals, which 
although important, do not have the effect of entirely prohibiting the power. Courts 
can make law as long as they respect those ideals and do not transcend the bounds of 
their jurisdiction.42 It is submitted in this section that the limitations on judicial law-
making render debatable the legitimacy of creativity in the realm of privacy. This 
paper does not intend to resolve the issue, but rai se concern over the presupposition of 
the Hosking majority that they had the natural ability to proceed as they did . 
'" Todd, above 11 24 , 9 16. 
40 See Todd, above 11 24 . 91 7. 
11 PvD, ab ven 15. 
42 Sec lloski11g ,, R1111li11g [2003] J N7. l R 38.\ pnra 119 ( I IC' ) Rnn(kr~o n I. " In de\'e loping remed ies to 
mee t perce i\·ed needs 111 "ha rd '" cases, Court s hould be careful no t to go beyond th e ir proper 
constitutional rol e. " 
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A Basic Constitutional Concerns 
With the emergence of the strict doctrine of store clecis is at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the formalist or ' declaratory' theory of the judicial function was 
predominant.43 Proponents of this theory believed that the function of the judiciary 
was to interpret the known law, not to make law. As understood by Lord Simonds, 
" ... our first duty ... to administer justice according to the law, the law which is 
established for us by Act of Parliament or the binding authority of precedent. .. "44 The 
rationale behind this theory is a conservative understanding of the constitutional roles 
of the separate branches of the Westminster system of government. 
When voted in by their constituency, the government acquires the law-making 
mandate as representative govemment.45 Legislation enacted by the government gains 
legitimacy with the passage through Parliament, as it has the approval of the 
democratically elected officials who are held accountable at subsequent elections.46 
Judicial law-making on the other hand can be seen to undermine this democratic ideal. 
Judges are not elected or answerable to the public for the decisions they make. This 
concern is augmented by the fact that judicial composition is not necessarily 
representative of the public at large, but is merely a reflection of the legal 
community.47 There is no way to ensure that judicial decisions are representative of 
the prevailing current social climate. Furthermore, due to near invincible nature of 
judicial tenure, judges are not subject to the same public pressure and accountability 
as the legislature.48 
43 Brian Dickson "The Judiciary- Law Interpreters or Law makers" ( 1982) 11 Manitoba LJ I, 4. 
44 Midla11ds Silico11 es Ltd v Scruttons Ltd [ 1962] AC 446, 467-8 : See also D011ag!tue v Steve11so11 , 
[19321 AC 562,567 Lord Buckmaster. In Lord Buckmasters view " ... the common law must be sought 
in law books by writers of authorit y and injudgmcnts of the judges ernrustccl \\ ith its administration." 
~
5 Philip A Joseph Constitutional a11d Ad111i11istroti1•e Lall' in New Zealand (2ed, Brookers, Wellington, 
2001) 320; BV Harris 'The Law-Making Power of the Judiciary· in PA Joseph Essays 011 t!te 
C-011s1u1111011 (Brooker<;. Wellington. 1995) 26'1 . 27 1 · See al~o [ l .l c1ffe F11gl"!t a11d A111 ff ica 11 Judge~ 
as Lm1•11wf.. ers (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) 20, 3 1. Jaffe asse rts that "[(!he single most significant 
aspect of a modern democracy is the popular election of the organs which exerci se the general 
lawmaking function." 
16 Jost.:ph. abo\ t.: n-1 5, 3 19-320: Mo1 ag ivlc DO\\t.: ll anJ Dunca n \\ "ebb Tlit' 1\'('11 /,rnl1111cl Lt'gal S.u1e111 . 
S1mc111res. Processes and Legal T!t eoJT (Jed, Butterworths, Well1ngto11 . 2002) 129. 
47 ILiVl Ri chardson "The Role of Judges as Policy Makers" ( 1985) 15 VLl \\' LR '-1 6. 50-5 1: Hon Michael 
Kirby "The Excit111g Australian Scene" in BD Gray and Rl.3 lcClintock Couns and Po!ic,•.· C!t ecking 
1!re Rola11ce (11rookers. Wellington. I 095) 2.:\ I. 257-258 . 
• ~ John 13c ll "Th1 t.:c t\l odcl s of the Judic ial l'unct1 on" in Rajcc\· Dh..1\·a11. R Sud:11sha n, and Salman 
Kurhshicl (eels) Judges and tire Judicial PoH·er: F:ssm ·s in Ho11011r of Jus1ice I R Kri1 l111a L_,·er (Swee t & 
Ma;rn ell . London. 1985 ) 5-l. 6 1: Richardson, abme n -l 7. 50. 
l l 
The most succinct way to explain these concerns is in terms of the separation 
of powers and parliamentary soverei gnty theories, both of which are primary 
constitutional doctrines of the Westminster system of gove rnment. 49 Separation of 
powers rests on the notion that all the branches of government are independent of 
each other, and should not encroach on the specified functions of the others. 50 
Simplistically, the functions of the legislature and judiciary are to make law and 
interpret law, respectively. Thus, the idea of judicial law making can be viewed as a 
transgression of the separation of powers doctrine . The theory of parliamentary 
sovereignty provides that the legislature is the supreme law making power, with an 
unlimited ability to enact or reform any law it so desires. 51 Judicial creation of new 
causes of action was therefore seen as a usurpation of the supreme law making power 
of the legislature. 
Although this formalist view maintained limited support throughout the 
century, it is now largely considered outdated and entirely unrealistic. 52 In reality, the 
judiciary and the legislature are partners in the law making process, and a naive 
approach based on division of powers obscures that relationship .53 The very existence 
of a complex body of legal common law principles is clear evidence that judges have 
always made law,s4 and the infamous case of Donaghue v Stevenson can be seen as a 
poignant example of how the courts actually create new causes of action_ss Judicial 
~
9 Geoffery Palmer and Matthew Palmer New Zealand Covem111 ent under MMP (Oxford Univers ity 
Press, Auckland , 1997) 128. 
50 See genera ll y Joseph, above n 45, 236-269; McDowell and Webb, abo\·e n --16, 120. 
51 Geoffery Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand ·s Constitution and Covern 111 e111 
( 4ed, Oxford Uni versit y Press, Auckland, 2004) 156 ["Brid led Power"]; Joseph, above n 45. 4 75-4 77: 
McDO\\ell and Duncan Webb, above n 46, 126- 130. 
52 See for example Lord Reid ''The Judge as Law Maker" ( 1972) 12 JPTL 22, 22. "There was a time 
when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law- they only declare it. Those with 
a taste for fai ry tales ,;;eem to have thought that in some laclcl 1n ·,;; cave the1e i<; hidden the Common 
Law in a ll its sp lendour and that on a judge 's appo intmen t there descends on h11n kno,\ ledge of the 
magic words Open Sesame. Bad decisions are given when the Judge has muddled the pass word and the 
wrong door opens. But we do not believe in fa iry tales any more.": See also Jaffe. above n 45 . 13. 
" Dicbon, abo\ c 11 --13, -I. Jaffe. abo1 c n --15. 20 and 75. 
q " I low otherwise could the system ha\'e expanded to flouri sh for a quarter of humanity in widely 
different soc ial cond itions and over cen turies beginning wi th the feudal age up to our own time of 
111terplanetary tra ve l, 111forrnati cs. nuclear fusion , and the double helix'/": Justice Kirb y. above n 47. 
261 
"Donaghue 1· SILTC11son. abO\"C n --14. In thi s case the plu1ntiffsucceeded 111 bring111g a cl.1irn aguinst a 
manufacturer who had manufacmred a bottle of gi nger beer also containing a decomposed sna il. Prior 
to th is case. there \\JS only k1h il11 y \\hen a cont1act bound the plamt11Ta11d dekndant. Yet. Lord Atkin 
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creativity is essential for keepin g the law in tun e with the current social climate and 
promoting the due administration of law, both key functions of the judicial system. 56 
Parliamentary sovereignty is still very much a li ve, however, and illustrated by 
the fact that judicial dec isions are forever subj ect to the wrath of the supreme law 
making power. 57 Any judgmcnt that constitutes an abuse of judicial power can be 
promptly checked by the passage of legislation to the contrary. 
B Scope of Judicial Law-Making Jurisdiction 
In the Court of Appeal , however, the Hosking majority failed to consider these 
constitutional concerns in any depth , and proceeded on the premise that the 
confirmation of the tort was within their judicial power. Although these concerns do 
not prohibit judicial law-making power, they do impose certain limitations. These 
limitations are summarised well by White, 58 
some limitations are intellectual (an obligation to give adequate reasons for results), some 
institutional (an obligation to defer to the power of another branch of government), some 
political (a need to avo id involvement in hotly partisan issues), some psychological (a need to 
recognise the role of the individual bias in judicial decision making) . 
The following intends to outline the limitations imposed by these constitutional 
principles, and briefly examine whether they have actually been observed in the 
privacy context. 
J The political bounclwy 
The constitutional justification for the absence of judicial accoun tabi lity is the 
principle of judicial independence. Th ie; principle representc; a fundamenta l va lue of 
derived the ·neighbourhood principle· from the Eng li sh common la\\ , thus creating a la\\ of liability 
for simple negligence. 
50 Richardson, above n 47, 52: R ,. H111 c.1 119971 J ZLR 529,5 79 (CA) I homns J: Jaffe , above n 45. 
11 : P Robson and P Watchman .Justi ce. I ord f1 e11111ng and the C'onstitut1011 (11dcllcs I td , Surrey. 1981) 
56-57. 
57 Jaffe, above n 45 , 19: R ,, I llll <'S. abO\'e n 56. 780 Thomas J: Richardson. above n -1 7. 51 
,x White rt1e. l111 ertc(111 Legal l rad11 1011 ((hlilld. 1976) 37 1-371 as c it ed 111 Ri chardson. abo\·c n-1 7, -19 . 
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the liberal democracy and the rule of law. 59 Being independent from the other 
branches of government, judges are removed from the political arena allowing them 
to apply even-handed justice, which in tum maintains public confidence in the body. 
If the judiciary is seen to be taking political sides, its appearance as an independent 
adjudicator is imperilled, and its integrity jeopardiscd .(,o It is therefore generally 
understood that the courts should take particular care when considering areas of social 
policy. 61 Social policy decisions can thrust judges into the political arena and 
jeopardize the appearance of judicial impartiality. 
It is acknowledged that there may be some areas of policy that are not so 
political as to put them outside the scope of judicial involvement. In response to Lord 
Devlin's view that 'public policy is almost always a closed book', Jaffe asserts that 
the judiciary has great opportunity to implement and develop those principles that 
have received the approval of Parliament and the public. 62 Thus, when there is 
community consensus regarding the issue, judicial lawmaking in policy areas may be 
· 63 appropnate. 
It can be said without hesitation that a general consensus that privacy is at 
least a value that deserves protection. Parliament itself has recognised this with the 
enactment of statutes including the Privacy Act 1993, the Broadcasting Act 1989 and 
the Harassment Act 1997. However, whether that value deserves the status of a right, 
the extent to which that right ought to be protected by law, and its relationship with 
other rights are controversial issues .64 Legislative action in the privacy area has been 
deliberate and particular,65 and most significantly while freedom of expression is 
protected by section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, the right to privacy is excluded. It is 
59 Joseph, above n 45, 262-264 ; Lord Re id co ns ide rs the princ iple to be the "' firs t essential " or any 
judge: Lord Re id, above n 52, 23. 
60 "Bridled Power", above n 51 , 297. 
61 Richard~on . above n 47. :,0: R I ' Hi11 p,·_ above n °'6. 5,()_ ') -+0: The Court of Appea l a lso acce pted tha t 
there ma y be some areas of soc ial poli cy that are best le ft to the leg islature, but obvious ly ass umed that 
this was not a case of social policy beyond the scope of the ir jurisdic tion : Hosking v R1111i111g, above n 
I, para 5 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
r,> Jaffe . abo , e 11 4 5, 75. 
6
' It is accepted thatjudic ial ac tivi sm 1s not an opportunit y for Judges to impose the ir o ,, n pe rsonal 
vi ews, as a judges vi ews carry no grea tn we ight than those o f any othe r c1t1 ,:en: ee Be ll . above n 4 8, 
60; Jaffe , above n 45, 46-47. 
6
~ r:o r example , in the Court o f Appea l j ud grnc nt o f I !n,king . .Jus ti ce f\ nde r~n n takes the ,·,cw tha t 
p1wacy is onl y a va lue, ..ind thus is no t jus tified 111 l11111t111g the rccog lll sed human 11 ght of freedom of 
express ion : 1/osking 1· R1111t111g . abo, ·e n I. pa ra 264-2 66 .l\ncle rson J di ssenting. 
c,, I losl, 111g 1· R11111111g. abo, c n I , para 20.3 Ke ith J d1 ssc 11t1ng. 
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outside the scope of this paper to consider the status and extent of protection that 
should be accorded to privacy interests, however it is submitted that the ambiguity 
sun-ounding the issue renders thi s a deeply political issue. 
Additionally, the response to the consultation paper issued in 1993 by the Lord 
Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Scotland effecti vely illustrates the diversity 
in attitudes towards specific civil law protection of privacy interests. Some believed 
that privacy should be protected as a right in itself as a matter of principle, 
independent of other causes of action. Others argued that the small number of 
infringements did not justify legislation, while several feared that intervention would 
go too far in stifling freedom of expression.66 Consequently, the Government 
concluded that there was insufficient public consensus on which to base statutory 
intervention, and therefore no case had been made out for such a significant 
development of the law. This leads to the conclusion that if Parliament strnggles to 
obtain sufficient public consensus, the courts have littl e chance of striking the 
necessary balance, particularly given their limited facilities. 67 As aptly stated by Lord 
Reid, "Parliament is the right place to settle issues which the ordinary man would 
regard as controversial."68 This is a strong indicator that perhaps for this reason alone, 
the Court should have left the affirmation of a privacy tort to the Legislature.69 
2 Necessity 
In light of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, it seems a natural 
concomitant that judicial intervention should be restri cted to cases where the 
administration of justice requires it. 70 In regard of a privacy tort, both Keith J and 
Anderson J argue that there is no pressing need in New Zea land law.71 In their 
"
1
' See fhe Gove rnmen t' s Response to the Hou,e of Commons National Heritage, elect Committee 
'Pri vacy and Media Intrusion" 14-16. 
67 Kirby, above n 47, 293 ; Lord Oliver "Some Reflections on the Development of the Doctrine of 
Neg ligence" in Legal Research Foundation of ew Zea land (Auckland 111vers1ty) Legal Reasoning 
a11d J11rliual . lc1i, ·i:, 111 · T1l'O ,·ie 11 ·s (Leg,d Rs:sea,ch Foundatwn.1\ud. land , 1992) 29 . . 33, R 1· lli11e.1, 
above n 56, 539; Richardson, above n -1 7, 49 
1
'~ Lord Reid , above n 52 , 23 . 
69 See Sumpter and Graham, above n 2. 290. The au thors emp has ise that" .. . the mmority's view 
reminds us of the dangers inherent in Judicial l:lll making: clange rs parti cularl y arn lL' in cases invoh·ing 
funcl;imL·ntal tension bet\\·een entrenched ri ghts and sh1ft111 g \ :dues." 
70 Sumpter and Graham, above n 2. 29-l . ~ ~ 
-, I lmk111g 1· R11111111g . abo\'e n I. para 2 15-222 Keith J and para 268 ,\11dc1 son .J d1 ssc11t111g. 
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op1n1on, th e fact that the to11 is rarel y invoked illustrates thi s Jack of necessity. 72 
However, [ would re fute the notion that the scarcity of cases represents a lack of 
demonstrated need.73 There is no suggestion that because so few cases are brought in 
trespass or Ry lands v Fletcher. 74 they should not be recogni sed as causes of action . 
The case of P v D, perhaps the classic wron g ful di sclosure case, cl earl y illustrates that 
there are privacy interests out there that arc incapable of protection under ex isting the 
common law. 
Nonetheless, it was unanimously agreed by the Court of Appeal in Hosking 
that the appellants claim did not come within the tort formulation . This was obviously 
not a case in which it was an urgent necessity that the Court recognise the tort in order 
to ensure the administration of justice. Thus, although there is a need for legal 
protection, there was no grave need for the courts to assume responsibility to remedy 
the situation in the context of Hosking.75 
3 Principled foundation 
If judges conclude they have the jurisdiction in the case at hand to extend the 
law, that extension must be justifiable as a development on the basis of fundamental 
principles .76 That is to say judicial creativity is not an invitation to the judiciary to 
'invent compl etely new ' principles .77 Judges must look to the plethora of p1inciples 
found or implied in the constitution, statutes, or the common law, and then develop 
the logical extension of those principles before choosing the appropri ate solution.78 
72 I losking ,. R1111ti11g. above n I, para 2 15-2 16 Ke ith J di ssenting. 
73 It will be argued later the sca rc ity of cases argued ma y in fac t be due to the unce rta inty surrounding 
the scope of the tort. 
74 Transco Pie 1• Stvckport Metropoli1a11 Borough Council [2004] 2 AC I, para 56 Lord Hobhouse. 
75 "Judic ia l ac ti vism has its place . T hat place is as a response to a clea r need resul1mg fro m a lac una in 
the law", and in thi s case "No interve ntion, di sc rete or general, was de monstra ted to the Court as 
nece,,a1y to r ro tec t New /ea lancl vict ims of inva<;io n, of prl\ acy ": Sumpter and (iraham. ahove n 2. 
294. 
76 Lord Oli ve r , above n , 3 1; Myers v Director of Puhlic Prosecllfions [ 1965 ] AC I 00 I, l 02 1- 1022 
Lord Reid; Dickson, above n 43, 6; Hoski11g ,, R11111i11g [2003] 3 NZLR 385, para 11 9 (HC) Rande rson 
J; Thi!> \\a~ Jbu c1d.11011Icdged by the 1rnJ01 1L y 111 //u.1 Ai11g, abo1e n I, p.11<1 -I (.i.iult i> ,111d Bl,111cha1d J. 
77 Jaffe, aho1-e n 45. 73. 
78 At times thi s ca n prove quite a di ffi cult exe rc ise and ca n result in a comple te dive rgence 111 opinions. 
as ev idenced by the con1rast111g views of Lord Atk111 and Lord Buckmaster 111 Oonaglwe ,, Ste1·e11so11 . 
\ Vhil c I ord Buckmas ter hclie1'Cd that there 11as no common la\\ pri nciple~ 10 suppPrt the c laim. Lord 
Atkin 11Js .iblc to den1e the pn 11c1plc tkll " ... )OU must not inJ tire you1 11e1ghhour ... ·· and thus yo u 
" . .. must take reasonable ca re to al'o1d ac ts or omiss ions which yo u can reasonah l) foresee \\'Oulcl be 
li ke ly to 1n_1ure your 11e 1ghhour. \Vho, the n. 111 l,111 1s my neighbour·> I he ans11c1 seems to be - pe rsons 
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This requirement provides protection from usurpation of the legislative law-making 
function. 79 
As mentioned above, the cw Zealand legislature has itself formally 
acknowledged the need for protection of privacy interests. Additionally, the Hosking 
majority claimed that the tort of wrongful publicity was fim1ly based on the principles 
of the common law,80 
... we arc taking developments that have emerged from cases in New Zealand and in the 
larger British jurisdiction and recognising them as principled and an appropriate 
foundation on which the law may continue to develop to continue to protect legitimate 
claims to privacy. 
In Tucker, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was proclaimed as the 
primary common law foundation for this new cause of action. 81 However this cause of 
action has since been rejected by Lord Hoffman in Wainwright v Home Office as a 
basis for developing a tort of privacy. 82 If this initial source falls short of proving 
adequate, it is therefore questionable to deem the later cases a principled foundation 
on which to continue to develop the law. Furthennore, although the United Kingdom 
equitable remedy of breach of confidence has developed to protect what are 
essentially privacy interests in many cases, United Kingdom courts have consistently 
refused to concede that privacy is an independent cause of action.83 Accordingly, it is 
dubious whether there is in fact a principled basis on which to expand the law, or 
whether the court is merely using this as a convenient hook. 
who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
con temp lation a~ heing <;O affected when I am direc ting my mind to the act, or om1,<;1on, \\hich are 
called in question: Donaghue 1· S1e1·emo11, above n 4-l, 580 Lord Atkin. 
79 Jaffe, above n 45 , 39. 
80 Hosking ,, R1111/i11g, above n ! , para ! I O Gault P and Blanchard J. 
xi Tucl,er 1· Nc:1 1.1 ,\lediu 011 ·11c:11/111>. al1ll\C 11 5,733 :VlcGccha11 J. 
~
2 Wai1111 ·righ1 and Another 1· l/0111 c: Ojjice [20031 LJK [IL 53 , para 36-47 (111.) l ord I loffman . 
83 See Kaye 1• Rohert.1·011 and Anolhff f 1991 j F R 62, para 66 (CA) Lord Gl1de\\C ll. ·· It is \\'Cll-known 
that in English law there 1s no right to privacy, and accordingly there 1s no right or action for breach or 
persons privacy"; 1Va11111righ1 1111d ,- /1101/,er 1· I /r1111£' O[(ice, aho\·e 11 112. para 1" I on! 1 loffm,lll . I ord 
I loffman stated" .. . I \\'Ould re_1 ec t the in\ iwtion to dec lare that s111ee at the latest 1950 there has be.:11 a 
previously unknown tort of invasion ofp1waC) ." 
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4 Principled deve!op111e11t 
Should it be found that there is sufficient principle on which to found a new 
cause of action, the law must also deve lop in a principled way, providing some 
definition of rights , duties and general principle.8-' As stated by Lord Reid, " ... if we 
are to prevent the law becoming a jungle you must give our young men some unifying 
principles which they can understand and use."85 The articulation of principle not only 
ensures that the rule can be applied in future cases, thus reducing uncertainty, but it 
also allows the citizen to confom1 their behaviour within the boundaries of the rule. 86 
The development of the pnvacy tort to date has been limited to the third 
f01mulation of the Prosser analysis, with the courts attempting to provide some 
guidance for future application based on the requirements that Prosser himself 
identified. The implementation of any broad general tort of privacy has quite suitably 
been left for the legislature should they consider it necessary. 87 Despite this 
restriction, the tort requirements articulated by the courts have been vague and 
consistently exclude important considerations that can be highly relevant to privacy 
claims. This is illustrated by section II of this paper. 
Furthetmore, the Hosking formulation diverged from the previous 
fonnulations, and in fact increases the scope for the application of discretionary 
justice rather than settled principle with its " reasonable expectation of privacy" 
requirement. As a result, the outcomes of privacy cases largely depend on the facts 
that arise rather than simple application of clearly articulated principles . As contended 
by Anderson J, the fo1mulation proposed by the majority may prove easier to state 
88 than to apply, and consequently th e ex ten t of protection that we can ex pect from the 
tort and the obligation we owe each other is unclear. Principl ed deve lopment is 
therefore deha tab le. 
8
~ Kirby. above n 47, 244 . 
8
) Lord Reid . aho ,-c n 52 . 27. 
Rr, Jaffe. abon: 11 -1 5, 37. 
87 See Hosking ,. R11111i11g. ahove n I . para 11 8 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
xx I loski11g ,. H11111111g, abon: n I. para 270 ,\mkrson J d1sscnung. 
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4 Reasoning 
The requirement that Judges provide adequate reasornng exists to provide 
further protection against the perils of judicial law-making_R9 ff a decision is 
rationalised in tem1s of accepted modes of legal reasoning, their choice is justified and 
the public knows why the choice was made. Most importantly, as is essential to the 
notions of open justice, the decision can then be criticised effectively. 90 Emotive 
reasoning will also be illustrative of the judge's sincere belief in their decision. As 
proposed by Jaffe, a judge should be so convinced by the decision that they are 
willing to apply the same principle to a later situation.91 
In relation to the tort of breach of privacy, there has certainly been extensive 
reasoning provided for the decision to recognise the existence of such a cause of 
action. The Hosking judgment is a notable example of detailed reasoning explaining 
in full the reasons for their final decision. Their assessment included discussion the 
experiences of overseas jurisdiction, international conventions, precedent and the 
legislative landscape. Although the validity of the reasoning is arguable, they have 
opened the doors for full criticism of what was a landmark decision. Undoubtedly the 
majority would be more than prepared to apply the decision to a later case, although 
the ease they would have in doing that remains to be seen. 
C Co11clusio11 
An assessment of the appropriate approach to judicial law making tends to 
suggest that privacy law is an issue that is more appropriately an issue for the 
legislature. The Bill of Rights Act background indicates that this may be an area of 
social policy that should not be adjudicated outside of the political realm, while the 
lack of demonstrated need in !!asking exacerbates this concern. Additionally, it is an 
area in which the courts have struggled to authenticate a principled basis for the 
introduction of the new tort , and have tailed to provide sound principles for future 
application . This exposes the tort as potentially Jacking the con titutional validity 
necessary to justify the creation of novel causes of acti n. onethclc s, having 
~
9 Ri chardson. abo\·c n -1 7, 52: Dickso n, abon: 11 13. 6. 
90 I larri s. abo ve n 45. 278 : Jaffe. above n 45. 37-J,. 
41 
Jan~. abo vc n-1 5. 38. 
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illustrated that there may be a democratic issue involved, the remainder of this paper 
progresses on the presumption that the courts do have constitutional validity. 
IV HOW SIIOULD WRONGFUL DISCLOSURE BE DEALT WITH IN NEW 
ZEALAND'! 
The purpose of this section 1s to assess whether judicial intervention is the 
appropriate approach to the development of a privacy tort, or whether it would be 
better dealt with by the legislature. Many areas of the New Zealand common law 
originate from United Kingdom common law, or at least consider it vastly instructive 
and persuasive. Consequently, it is natural to assess the position of their law of 
privacy. It will be argued that the reason that the English courts have failed to 
recognise a tort of breach of privacy is due to the extent of Government investigation 
and subsequent abstinence. However, the inaction of the United Kingdom courts does 
not preclude judicial action in New Zealand because our Parliament has remained 
completely silent in this particular area of law. Despite this, it will be submitted that 
legislative intervention is the appropriate approach. Only a statutory tort can provide 
the level of certainty required to guarantee deserving complainants have an accessible 
legal remedy. 
A The Position in the United Kingdom 
It has been long established that a general law of invasion of privacy is not 
recognised by English law, in neither statute nor common law. 92 Although the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 placed an obligation on the courts and 
. I . . 9' 1 leg, s aturc to protect privacy 111tercs ts, - the Courts have e lec ted to re ax th e 
requirements of the equitable remedy of breach of confidence in order to protect what 
are essenti a ll y rrivacy inlerest s9-1 The development of th e to11 ha· in fact lead to th e 
92 See for example Km ·e v Robertson and Another, above n 83, para 66 Lord Cil1dewell. ·· lt 1s well-
k11 01111 th..1 L 1n l'. 11g l1 ~h la11 the1e is 110 11ghl to p11 1acy, and acco rd111gl1 Lht:1t: 1s 1w 11gl ll ofac tion fo1 
breach o r perso ns pn vaey" ; Wainll'rig li r and. /1101!,er ,· ! !0 111c Office, abo, e 11 82, para ]5 l orcl 
Hoffman . Lord l lolTman stated·· ... I would re.1 ec l the invit;ition to dec lare th ;i t since at the lates t 1950 
there has been a previously unknown tort of invas ion of privacy." 
9
·' The l lum,lll Rights !\e t I 998 incorporated the Fu rope;i n C'o nl'cn ti on for the Prntec ti nn o f l luman 
Ri ghts and Funda mental Freedoms 1950. /\rll clc 8( I) of the Com cn t1on prm ides that "L1 cryonc has 
the ri ght LO n.:~pec t for hi s private and famil y life. hi s home and hi s correspondence." 
•,.i Sec fc.ll exa mp le Oo11g!t1.1 and O!l1C:r.1 ,· !le/lo .' Lui [200 1 J QB 967 (CA). 
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creation of two distinct versions of breach of confidence,95 one of which is almost 
analogous to the privacy tort that has now been recognised by the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal. 96 However, the law nonetheless fails to provide comprehensive coverage 
of privacy interests ,97 and Judges have not been afraid to expre s their concern 
regarding this inadequacy.98 Without the recognition of an independent breach of 
privacy, the United Kingdom courts will experience continuous difficulty reconciling 
their decisions with their duty under the Human Rights Act. 99 
The reason why Judges are confronted with this predicament is due to the 
depth of government inquiry into protection of privacy interests. Privacy has been 
topical in the United Kingdom for over 40 years, resulting not only in Committee 
inquiries, but also several proposed Bills, none of which have been successful. 100 The 
central concern relating the protection of privacy appears to be the restriction it would 
place on the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 101 Although 
acknowledging the ultimate aim as the balancing these two basic rights, a consistent 
theme emerging is that the enactment of a statutory tort of infringement of privacy 
95 See Hosking v Run ting, above n I , para 42 Gault P and Blanchard J. The first is the traditional cause 
of action available in respect of use or disclosure where the information has been communicated in 
confidence. The second version is available in respect of publication of personal information of which 
the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy irrespective of any burden of confidence, but only 
were the publication is likely to highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. 
96 It was even suggested by Justice Sedley in Douglas v Hello ! that there is now no need to 
" ... construct and artificial relationship between intruder and victim: it can recognise privacy itse lf as a 
legal principle drawn from the fundamental value of personal autonomy." He was the only judge in this 
Court to support the suggestion that United Kingdom common law could accept the ex istence of a 
breach of pri vacy tort in its own right: Douglas and Others v f-lello 1 Ltd , abo ve n 94, I 00 I edley J. 
97 See for example Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 42. In this case the European Court of 
Human Rights concluded that the law of the United Kingdom did not provide adequate remedy for 
breaches of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention. The ea e invol ved a man who had 
attempted to conm1it suicide by slitting his wrists on a public street. A surve illance camera operated by 
the local council caught footage of the man shortl y after the incident leaning aga inst a fence with the 
knife still in hi s hand . They sold still s extracted from the footage to the media , which were published in 
newspapers and on national televi sion. In the publica ti ons hi s face was either unmasked or 
inadequately masked. 
98 See for example Kaye v Robertson and another, above n 83, 70 Bingham LJ. ln this pre- Human 
Ri ght <; Act ca<;e R111 gham .I complain~ that ·'Thi, ca , e nonethe les<; highlighh. ye t aga in . the fa ilure of 
both the common law of England and statute to protect in an effec tive way the personal privacy of 
individual citizens."; See al so Douglas and Others v f-lello 1 Ltd [2003] EMLR 641 , 72 1 (Ch D) 
Lindsay J. In thi s post-lluman Ri ghts Act case, Lmdsay J made reference to the European Court of 
lluman Ri ght~ dect~io11111 Ped c111d ad, 110\\kdged that " . . \\ hc1e the la\\ uf cunfidencc did nut opc1atc 
our domes ti c la w has already been held to be 111adequatc" 
99 Hosking ,, Ru111111g , above n I, para 40 Gault P and Blanchard J. 
100 Bills re lnt111g to privncy interests were introduced by the folio\\ tng; Lord Mancron ( 1 % 1 ). 
Al e-.;a nder I yon ( I % 7) . Rri an Walden ( I %9). Willi am Ca ~h ( 1987 ). John Bn)\\ nc ( I 080) \ Pri\ ac) 
and Del::l mat10 11 8111 \\as ;i lsu dra fted 111 1998. 
101 See Report of the Committee on Pri vacy and Related Vl atters ( 1990) Cmnd 1102. 50 [the Calcutt 
ReponJ ; i\a t1011al I lentagc Committee f'm·an· w11/ i\led,a /111ru1w 11 (-l '" Report ) ( 1993 ) I IC 29-l- l. 5. 
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would be an unwarranted restriction on freedom of express ion. The restriction would 
be unwarranted because there is no overwhelming case for privacy protection in this 
manner. 102 It has been consistently beli eved that protecti on o f pri vacy interests 
through alternati ve means would prov ide adequate protecti on to the ri ght s being 
infringed . 
Following the Younger Report, all the reports were concerned with media 
intrusion, and the preferred method of protection has thus generally been press self-
regulation.1 03 As expressed by the United Kingdom Government in their response to 
the National Heritage Select Committee' s report, this can probably be explained by a 
long-standing reluctance to see statutory control of the press. 104 Press self-regulation 
is the way to ensure the least infringement on press freedom , whil st allowing a 
method of recourse for the complaints . 
Albeit few , there have been instances where statutory protection of privacy 
interests has been recommended. In his 1993 revi ew, David Calcutt recommended the 
introduction of a statutory tort of infringement of privacy. His justification was that 
press self-regulation, advocated by the earlier Calcutt report had fail ed and that a tort 
had become the only effective solution. 105 Parliament did not act upon his advice. A 
like recommendation was made by the Select Committee of the Department for 
Culture, M edi a and Sport who considered it necessary in order to fulfil their 
obligations under the Human Rights Act. 106 The Government rej ected the proposal on 
102 Report of the Committee on Privacy ( 1972) Cmnd 50 12, 12 and 206; the Ca lcutt Repo1 , above n 
IOI , 46-53; Pri \'acy and Media Intrusion: The Government's Response to the I louse of Commons 
National Heritage Se lec t Committee ( 1995) Cnu1d 298 1, 16 and 23; Privacy and Media Intrusion: The 
Government 's Response to the Fi fth Report of the Culture, Media and Sport Se lec t Conm1ittee (2002-
2003) Cmnd 5985. 2: Repo rt of the Commi ttee on Privacy ( l 972) Cmnd 50 12 206 (the Younger 
Co nm1i ttee). 
'03 Privacy and Media Intrusion: The Government's Response to the House of Commons Na tional 
Heritage Se lec t Co mmittee, above n I 02, 16; 1 ati onal Heritage Conm11ttee, above n l O I, 6; Privacy 
and Media I nu usion : The Gove rn 111ent ·s Respun se lO the F1 fth Repo1 I of the Cu ltu, e, :\kd1;1 and , port 
Selec t Co mmittee, above n I 02. l . 
,o-1 Pri vacy and Med ia intrusion: The Gove rn me nt ·s Response to the House or Co mmons Na tional 
Heritage Se lec t Committee, above n I 02. I. 
100 Rcvie\\' of press sc If- regul at ion ( 1993) C'mnd 2 I , "'. "'6-57 I le a !so rccommcndccl the 
imple1m.:ntat 1on ofa st:.llu tory complai nts tribunal. 
106 Selec t Committee of the Department fo r Cu lture. ~lcd1a and Sport Pri,·ac, · 11 11d /l/ed111 /111rnsin11 
(2003) I IC 45 8- 1. -U. 
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the basis that there didn't appear to be any need for Parliamentary intcrvcntion ,107 and 
once again emphasised strong support for press self-regulation . 108 
The effect of the continued governmental consideration of a statutory tort is 
that the issue is now politically saturated, and completely outside of the realm of the 
judiciary to develop this tort independently. Any judicial intervention would be a 
patent interference with Parliamentary intent, and would exceed the constitutional role 
of the court as discussed above. Thus, irrespective of any attitudes regarding the 
inadequacy of privacy protection, judges are prohibited from taking the initiative to 
ensure that protection themselves. 
B The New Zealand Comparison 
Although the question of whether a statutory tort should be introduced has 
never been directly considered by the New Zealand Law Commission, the possibility 
of a judge-made tort did arise in the Law Commission's discussion paper of February 
2002. In the report the Law Commission expressed the view that there was no reason 
why a judge-made tort could not develop side-by side with statutory provisions 
enacted to protect particular types of personal information or to deal with particular 
methods of publication. 109 It recognised that this is the path that the New Zealand 
courts have chosen to take thus far. 
Consequently, the New Zealand courts are not faced with the same blatant 
deterrent as those in the United Kingdom. everthcless, there is some force in Justice 
Keith's argument that the statutory context tells strongly against the existence of the 
tort, particularly given the speci fie nature in which privacy has been dealt with and 
the reluctance of the legislature to impose a broad obligation to respect privacy 
desrite law re form proposals and scholarly call s in commonwealth jurisdictions .
110 
At 
107 Privacy and Media Intrusion: The Government ·s Response to the Fifth Report of the Culture. Media 
and Spo1 t Se k el Co111111ittee, abo,·e 11 I 02, 2. 
108 Priq icy and Media Intrusion: The Government 's R spon~e to the Fifth Report l'ithe Culture. \lcdia 
and Sport elect Committee, above n I 02, 1. 
109 New /'.ea land aw Conm1iss1on, above n 4, 24. 
11 0 Hosl, 11 w ,, R11111i11g. aho \'e n I. para 185-207 Keith .I disse nting. I le argues that there 1s a stro ng 
contrast be tm.:en thc landscape of the la,, in re lati on to p1i,aq. som' or,, hic h is "1t.: ry de nse :rnd 
deliberate" . and Do11ogh11 c ,. S1e,·e11so11 where common la,, authoriti es and principles completely 
occ upi ed the fi e ld: / lmking ,· R11111i11g. above 11 I. para 185 l(<.: 1th J d1 sse nt111g. 
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the real heart of hi s opposition arc the Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Privacy Act 1993, 
and the Broadcasting Act 1989. 
The most problematic issue in the legis lative landscape is the exclusion of 
privacy from the Bill of Rights Act. 111 Sir Geoffery Palmer articulated the reason 
behind this exc lusion were problems of definition and certainty. 11 2 lt is not a 
necessary corollary from this that privacy is deserved of lesser protection than the 
right to freedom of expression. lt merely indicates that the broad scope of the interest 
renders it more appropriately to deal with it in a specific manner. Thus, there is no 
reason why privacy could not be considered a justified limitation under section 5 of 
the Bill of Rights Act. 113 Keith J persuasively argues that the near complete failure of 
the tort in the United States and the relevant Canadian jurisdictions indicates that the 
tort did not qualify as demonstrably justified. 114 However, on the converse, the 
majority validly contend that it is difficult to argue that a limit imposed to give effect 
to a right protected in international conventions is not demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society. 115 The validity of such a limit of freedom of expression 1s 
further justified when the remainder of the legislative landscape is assessed . 
The Privacy Act 1993 is focused on the collection and dissemination of 
personal infonnation by public and private agencies. The print media are exempt from 
liability under the Privacy Act, 116 a significant omission considering the fact that 
activities of the television media are restricted by the Broadcasting Act 1989. To 
111 See ! l osking \' Runting, above n 1, para 18 1 Keith J di ssenting. 
112 A Bill of Ri ghts for New Zea land: A White Paper [ 19851 AJHR A6 para 10.14.i . This was also the 
basis of his recommendation aga inst the introduction of a broad statutory right to privacy in New 
Zealand law: Gtoffery Palmer "Privacy and the Law·· [ 1975] NZ LJ 747. 
113 Section 5 provides that," ubjec t to sec tion 4 of thi s Bill of Rights, the ri ghts and freedoms 
contained in thi s Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits presc ribed by law as can 
be demon <; trabl y ju<;tified in a free and democra ti c <;oc1ety .. 
11 4 f-losf..ing ,. R1111ti11g, above n 1, para 210-220 Keith J di ssentmg. In hi s argument Keith is influenced 
signifi can tl y by two article ; HatTy Kalven Jr, above n J I, and Diane Zimmerman "Requiem for a 
Heavyweight: A Farewell to [their] Privacy Tort" ( 1983) 68 Cornell L Rev 291. 
11 ' flu.1/,111g ,. R11111111g, abo,c 11 I, para 11.i Gdult P and Bla11cha1d J. ,\1t1clc 17( I) ufthc L nitcd 
Na tions International Covenant on Civi l and Pol1ttca l Ri ghl s provides that .. 'o one shall be sub1 ec ted 
to arbitrary or unlawful 111terference with hi s privacy, family, home or co rrespondence. 1101 to unla,\ fu l 
attacks on hi s honour and reputation." Article 16 of the United Na tions Convent ion on the Ri ghts or 
Children pro, ides "The ri ghl lo protec tion from arb itrary () r un la,\ ful intnfcrence \\ it h pri\·acy. fam il y. 
home, or eorrespondcnci.:, or attacks 011 honour and reputatwn ·· 
11 6 See Pn\'acy Act 1993. s 2(1): exception (xiii) to the ckfi 111t1011 of"agency"' . See also the defi nitions 
in s 2 ol" .. ne,, 111cd 1u111"' and '" news actl\·1t1es". 
impose common law obligations on th e media from which they have been deliberately 
exempt under statute could be seen as constitutionally inappropriate. 117 
Although this argument has some strength, it was not necessarily Parliaments 
intent th at the print med ia be unexceptionall y exc luded from liability. Comments o[ 
the former Privacy Co mmissioner, Bruce Slane, prove informative on this issue. 
Indeed, he inferred that the reason for the exclusion of the print media from the 
Privacy Act was to prevent undue limitation on the right to freedom of expression. 118 
His feeling was that because the notion of privacy is difficult to define, it would be 
dangerous to attempt to create a set of laws governing privacy in relation to print 
media. Nonetheless, he warned that the press must accept a certain amount of self-
discipline and respect for individual autonomy, and a failure to oblige may result in 
positive action to remedy the situation. Most notably, he said that in theory th ere was 
no reason why a tort or statute could not be created, similar to those creating liability 
in defamation and negligence. The inference that can be taken from this is that there is 
no legislative intent to preclude the development of the law of privacy through other 
methods such as tort law. 119 
This is further supported by the fact that there is nothing in the Privacy Act to 
suggest that it was intended to be a code. Moreover, it was established in Hobson v 
Harding that the Privacy Act did not supplant common law remedies.120 It is also 
significant that the Privacy Act enacted after the judgment of Tucker, Mo1ga11 121 and 
Marris. 122 It can thus be assumed that the Government was aware of thi s case and the 
implications it could have in terms of judicial legal deve lopment. If Parliament 
opposed the possibility of a judge-made tort, expression of that disapproval should 
have been made at the time the Privacy Act was implemented. If Par li amen t intends 
11 7 Hosking,, Ru11ti11g [2003] 3 ZLR 385, para 127 (!IC) Randerson J. 
118 I31uce Sla ne. \'c11 /c<1!<111d P1i1c1cy Co mnm,,,ioncr ·\' ol\lc 11..:11,, p1epa1cd for LI\\ \~1a Co11lc:1c11cc" 
(Columbo, Sn Lanka, Sep tember l 993) in Prt\'(/cy Act I Y93 ,/ 1clect1011 of hackgrn111ul 111111en11/1 011 
th e Prim( \' Act IYY3 1111t! rhc Office o{tl,e Pm•ac'.l' Co111 1111ssio11er, Juli · IYY2-Apri/ /Y94. 7; See also 
(18 Mar 1993) 533 LPL) 141 33, 14 l.35, 141 37, and 14139. 
11 9 Slane. aho1-c n I I R. 7 
120 I lob.rn11 1· //unli11g [ I <)95 j I 11 R~Z 3>-l~, 3-1 6-3-P ( I IC) l'horp J. 
121 /Vforga 11 ,. Tl 'NZ ( I :-.l arch 1990) l-lC ChC'h CP 67 90 I lo lland J. 
122 /1/a, ·r,.1 ,. /'I 3 1\·er11 ·orA Sa1·1ces L11/ ( 1-1 October 1991) I IC \\·0: Cl' 75-1 91 i\e,vo r J. 
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an enactment to cover an entire field of law and to preclude judicial development, it 
needs make that restriction clear. 123 
Hence, it could in fact be argued that the legislature has left the field open for 
the courts to fill in the gaps. Despite Keith J's arguments to the contrary, 12-1 
Parliament has taken no action that could even be interpreted as precluding the courts 
from developing a new tort. Thus it is not a necessary concomitant of the United 
Kingdom preference to extend breach of confidence, that the New Zealand courts are 
precluded from independently diverting from that lead. The recognition of a separate 
cause of action would at least provide greater clarity in the law. 125 
C Tile Appropriate Approach 
The final remaining question is whether parliamentary or judicial intervention 
1s 111 fact the preferable option for a breach of privacy tort. There are certainly 
advantages to judicial development, however is this an area of law that would benefit 
from case-by-case development and empirical testing of the law through this process? 
The experience of the tort to date, and the discussion in part II become highly relevant 
in this assessment. It is argued that it is through legislative intervention alone that 
New Zealand can best guarantee the administration of justice. 
1 Problerns with judicial development 
As evidenced in part II, the development to date of the wrongful publicity tort 
1s an illustration of gradual common law development impeding legal certainty and 
stability. As explained above, the courts have attempted to incrementally refine the 
tort fomrnlation , yet its precise bounds remain unacceptably contentious. The great 
disadvantage of thi-; i-; that it is extremely diffi cult to predict when a case is g0ing t0 
fall within its scope and succeed in court. This in tum inhibits future development of 
the cause of acti0n , a-; development reli cs on the willingness of complairnrnt -; to 
pursue their claim throu gh the court sys tem. Willingnes naturally decreases when 
"' / losl,111g ,. Ru111tl!g abo\'l:: 11 I , para 22S ripping .I . 
124 //01·ki11g 1· R11111i11g. abo,c 11 I. para 185-207 Keith .J d1 sse nt111g. 
12
' / losl, 111g ,. /?11 111i11 !!,, abo, c 11 I. para -1 5 ( ,ault I' and Bla11chard . 
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outcomes arc unpredictable as litigation is a costly exercise, and the" .. . high cost of 
legal services is a powerful disincentive to unaided would be litigants. Overall it 
seems to bear particularly heavily on the individual litigants on private disputes . . . " 126 
Thus, there is an ironic interplay between the need for cases to ensure development, 
and the scarcity of cases argued due to this very lack of development . 
Legal aid could potentially alleviate the problem in part, but with restrictive 
qualifying criteria, it does not entirely resolve it. As a consequence, the law may 
become dependent on wealthy plaintiffs who are prepared to suffer the expense of 
taking a case to litigation. The number of cases that have involved public figures or 
celebrities in both New Zealand and the United Kingdom so far is already suggestive 
of such a pattern emerging. 127 Yet, financial capacity is not the only deterrent of 
taking Collli action. Potential litigants must also be prepared to confront the paradox 
that to protect their privacy they will have to go to the most public forum, the 
Court. 128 It seems illogical to require someone complaining of a breach of privacy that 
is highly offensive to the ordinary objective person to stand up and further disclose 
these private facts to an open courtroom. If the breach was of such a sensitive nature, 
this would add considerably to the reluctance to complain. 
In light of all this, it seems certain that it will be a considerable amount of time 
before the tort can be defined with any real certainty. 129 If further persuasion is 
necessary, one need look no fmiher than the growth of this very tort to date. The lack 
of progress made since its first inception is a striking manifestation of this concern. 
Judicial decisions should provide reasonable guidance regarding the bounds of the 
law, 130and this simply not happening with this tort. As result, judicial development 
entails a great risk that rights of privacy will he breached and deserving plaintiffs will 
be obstructed from obtaining true justice. 
126 Richardson, abo\'e n 4 7. 46. 
127 For example Tu cker. above n 5: P "D, above n 15: I losking. above n I: Kaye. above n 83: Douglas. 
above n 9-1 : C11 1111Jlw ll ,. if(;\' Ltd [2 00]] 2 WI R 80 (Cl\) 
128 T odd, abon: 11 2-1. 925. 
129 "Was Privacy the Winner on the Da y'/ " , abo,·e n 6. 18-1 . 
1
'
0 Ri chardson. abo\'c 11 -1 7. 50. 
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2 Th e heneji.ts parliamentary 111terve11tio11 
With the impl ementation of a statutory tort Parliament would be able to make 
conclusive decisions concerning the scope of the tort, and provide guide lines for th e 
more fact dependent issues. As regards the definite scope of the tort, legislation could 
include detenninations of whether it is an intentional tort, whether the disclosure must 
result in identification of the person to whom the facts relate, and confirm whether or 
not a civil cause of action is limited to individuals or extends to corporate entities. 131 
Furthermore, the threshold necessary for the granting of injunctions could be given 
serious consideration and finally concluded. 132 This would introduce an invaluable 
degree of clarity to the law. 
In tem1s of guidance, legislation could finally provide some structure 
pertaining to the balancing exercise between the right to freedom of expression and 
privacy, in order to allay popular concerns regarding the "chilling effect" privacy 
could have on freedom of expression. 133 Comment could also be made on the extent 
of privacy protection that can be expected by public figures , and when someone will 
be considered a public figure in the sense that inforn1ation relating to their private 
lives may be considered within legitimate public interest. 13 -1 As well as public figures 
themselves, the families of those in the public eye could be infonned of the extent to 
which they are accorded protection. 
As well as defining the scope of the wrongful publicity tort, Parliament would 
also be able to consider whether a privacy tort should be limited to public 
dissemination of private facts. Prosser's analysis involved four different heads of 
131 Corporate entities are exc luded from liability under the Privacy Ac t: Privacy Ac t l 993, s 2( l ): 
description of"individual". llowe\er the issue has not been decided Jt Common Law: Sec "Was 
Privacy the \V lllner on the Day?", above n 6, 80. 
132 The Court of Appeal in Hosking ra ised the threshold for granting injunctions, a decision which has 
been criti c ised by Evans who emphasises the importance or privacy plain tiffs of preventing 
publi c.1t 1011. "\\"as P1 i\ ac1 the \\"illllCl on the D.i1 ·r·. abLn e 11 Ci. 183-18--f. 
1>
3 Although the import ance of freedom of expression has been recogn ised, none of !he privacy tort 
cases thi s far have prov ided any se t structure to the ba l:rnc 111 g process bet11·ecn freedom or express ion 
and privacy. I hi s has been criti cised in academic writlllg inc ludmg: Sec l'obin , above n 37, 2 18. Any 
limi tation 011 the ri ght to freedom ore,pn.?s,ion clcscn·es :rnd requ11cs a h:"ml. in-dept h analysi, and 
bala11c111!.!, C.\CrCISC. rhe lcad111!.! di sc ussio n or seC ll L)ll 5 or the Bill or Rights ,\ et \\ hich pro1 ides a lirnll 
the ri !.!. ht ; contained there Ill is -/o. /i111 11n· o(Trm11porr ,, Noon [ 19921 3 N7 1 R 260 (C ). 
1' 1 Se~ ge ne1ally l/usl,111g ,. H11111i11g. alxm: n I. pa ra 120-121 (iault I' .ind 13 1anchard J. 
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privacy, 135 all of which have been incorporated into United States law in varying 
degrees. Although the majority in Hosking states that the only concern in this case is 
the tort of wrongful publicity, they infer that there may come a time when the court 
will need to decide whether a tortious remedy should be available for unreasonable 
intrusion into a person ' s solitude or seclus ion. 136 Such a claim is not completely 
foreign to New Zealand, as the Broadcasting Standards Authority has clearly assumed 
that intrusive conduct is within their jurisdiction. Intentional interference with an 
individual's interest in solitude or seclusion is the third principle of the Authority. 137 
ConcutTent consideration of this tort would add even greater certainty to the law by 
precluding the potential for future judicial decisions that would be of retrospective 
effect. 
The value of the legislative process in ensuring the adequacy of the law cannot 
in itself be understated. The very existence of the complex process is illustrative of 
the huge benefits it entails. The process engages in a much wider consultative process, 
and allows for extensive public input a well as extended and detailed debate in 
Parliament of all the relevant issues. 138 As discussed above, p1ivacy is a rather 
political area and for this reason, it is preferable that the steps taken to protect it are 
authorised and supported by the general public . The publicity would also have the 
benefit of increasing public awareness of the protection of privacy interests under the 
law, 139 thus effectively increasing access to justice. 
Moreover, the legislative process allows for legal certainty to be attained 
quickly. While the courts may take years to build up a coherent body of principles, 
Parliament can enact those principles rapidly, providing clear guidelines to which the 
public can confonn their behaviour. This asse rtion is often countered by the argum ent 
1" Pro~se r and Kee ton. al:iove 11 13. 51-866. 
136 Hosking ,, R11111i11g, above n I, para 11 8 Gault P and Blanchard J. "First, we emphas ise Ihat at thi s 
point we arc concerned only with the third formul ation of the pri vacy tort identifi ed by Prosse r and 
developed in the United States: wrongful publicity given to private lives . We need not decide al this 
tilllc whcthc1 a 1on ious 1c1111.:dy should be a, a ilabk in ~ c\\ ZealJml la\\ fo1 u1 11 easo11able 1n11us1on 11110 
a person 's so litude or seclu ion." It is also acknowledged that any " .. h1 gh-lc\ el and\\ ide tort of 
invasion or pri vacy should be a malter fo r the leg1sla1ure" : flmking, above n I, para 11 0 Gault P and 
Blanchard J. 
rn Sec 1/01-ki,w ,. R11111i,w. ah<l\'e n l. pnra I 05 Gault r and 111 anchard J 
n R Sec general y Joseph:~ibo\·e n -1.5, 3 12-3 16; "Bridled l\ll\ e1", abo\c n 5 1, 193 198. 
139 Sir Kenneth Keith " Poli cy and Law: Politic ians and Judges (n nd poe ts)" in RD Gray and RB 
McClinLoc k (eds ) Co11n.1 o/11/ Poli Cl': Cl1l'c f.. i11g thl' Holann' ( [hooke rs. \\ " c l lington. I lJ() ::, ) I 17. 153. 
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it is inappropriate and inefficient to allow injustices to accumulate until such at time 
that the legislature finally feels compelled to intervene. The courts have the ability to 
apply swift justice to the case at hand , and should not hesitate to do so. 140 This 
appears to be the basis of the justification to take positi ve action in Hosking, I.JI 
From time to t1111e ... there ari se in the courts parti cular fa ct situations calling for 
determination in circumstances in which the current law does not point clearly to the 
answer. Then the courts attempt to do justice between the parties in the particular case. In 
doing so the law may be developed to a degree . . . That is the traditional process of the 
common law. 
Although this argument caITies force where there is in fact a pressing need to serve 
justice in the case at hand , with unanimous agreement that the appellants were outside 
the scope of the tort, Hosking was not such a case. When there is a lack of real 
necessity, the advantages of the legislative process should not be forfeited and 
comprehensive legal certainty should be obtained through statute. 
Finally, carefully considered legislation has a further advantage in that it can 
provide a conclusive tort fomrnlation whilst also allowing a certain degree of 
flexibility in the provision that would allow the courts to ensure the administration of 
justice. Parliament cannot legislate to cover every possible situation that may arise, 
and they would not attempt to do so. The courts retain the task of performing the 
ultimate balancing exercise of competing interests, whilst having the benefit of 
legislative guidance and direction in doing so. For this reason I would refute Prosser's 
argument that the risk or a statute being too detailed, or so general that the courts 
would have to do all the work anyway, renders it preferable that the tort be developed 
b b · 14? on a case- y-casc as1 s. -
D Concl11sio11 
Although cw Zealand common law is usually aims to be consistent with that 
or the United Kingdom, privacy law is an area where the climate in the two countri es 
11
" Jaffe, abon: 11 -1 5. 18. 
i.i i Hosking " R1111ti11g. abO\'C n L p;:ira -I Gault P and Blanchard J. 
\ le rodd. abo ve 11 2'-l . 176-1 77. 
JO 
is significantly different. This justifies a divergence in cw Zealand from United 
Kingdom common law tradition, and recognition of breach of confidence and privacy 
as two distinct heads of liability. 143 However, judicial development of the tort would 
have the effect of inhibiting the exercise of the courts primary responsibility of 
ensuring the administration of justice. Due to the fact that the tort is developing at 
such a painfully slow rate, worthy plaintiffs arc deterred from taking their case to 
court for fear that they will be unsuccessful. Legislative clarification would mean 
definite breaches of privacy would become more apparent and therefore greater 
accuracy in the prediction of outcomes would be possible. As a result, the possibility 
of legal recourse would become more accessible and appealing. In the end it would 
provide for a much greater protection of individual rights. 
VI CONCLUSION 
There exist certain circumstances when it is within the jurisdiction of the court 
to independently develop or change the law. However when the opportunity for 
creativity arises it is important that the Court consider whether they have the 
jurisdiction, the correct approach to that task, and whether the decision would actually 
be more suited to the legislative process .144 It has been submitted that the majority did 
not give the requisite degree of consideration to these factors, and thus made a 
mistake in affim1ing the common law tort of wrongful publicity to private lives. 
Although it has been illustrated that there are a potential democratic and 
constitutional concerns in relation to judicial creativity in this particular the area of 
the law, the real worry relates to how effective it is in ensuring justice is served. The 
uncertainty plaguing the cause of action i having a profound effect on the 
development of the cause of action, and thus the ability of the law to protect the rights 
of individuals . 
1"1 Hosking ,. R11n1ing. ahovc 11 I . p:ira 4 ,; Ga ul! P a11d fll anc hard .I The majori t}- con~1dcrcd thal " ... ii 
\\·ill be conduci\ e or clea rer analys is lU recog111 se breaches or cunl1de nce and pn Yac) as separate 
causes or action ." 
111 R ,. /lin es, abO\c n 56. 537 Ri cha rdson P a11d Ke ith J. 
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Nevertheless, "even in the limited area of privacy with which we arc presently 
concerned there are acknowledged gaps in the law".145 Certain privacy interests can 
fall through the holes of the existing causes of action, and it is th rcfore imperative 
that there is some other form of recourse for th ose who have had the ir rights infringed. 
A carefully considered statutory tort could have th e advantage of providing a sw ift , 
certain, and comprehensive forn1Ulation of the tort, while allowing the courts enough 
flexibility to ensure the due administration of justice in each individual case. Such a 
tort would not be entirely novel, as certain Canadian states have chosen to effect the 
implementation of privacy torts at a statutory level. 146 I would therefore strongly 
recommend that the Government give serious consideration to the enactment of a 
statutory tort of privacy. 
11
' llus l,111g 1· R11111i11g , abon.: n I. para I 09 Gault P and Bla nch.ml J. 
140 Pri vacy Acts providing fo r a statulory tort have hecn enacted 111 British C'olumb1a. Ma111toba and 
SaskatclH.: \\'an . 
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